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• 
Hepatic Hepatitis C Virus RNA in Chronic Hepatitis C
To the Editor: Shindo and colleagues (1) wonder whether patients who have chronic hepatitis C and a long-term biochemical response to interferon but remain positive for hepatitis C virus (HCV) RNA in the serum or liver will have a relapse later.
We are following a cohort of 62 long-term responders from two trials that enrolled 425 patients (264 [62%] had chronic hepatitis and 161 [38%] had cirrhosis). These patients were treated for 6 to 12 months with interferon-a2b or interferon-anl at 5 to 10 MU three times a week. The long-term responders consisted of 41 men and 21 women (mean age, 43.6 years; range, 20 to 62 years). Fifty-five patients had chronic hepatitis and 7 had cirrhosis. All patients were positive for HCV RNA (according to nested polymerase chain reaction on the 5' untranslated region of HCV) before therapy, and all were checked every 3 months after interferon therapy was discontinued. Hepatitis C virus RNA has been retested in all patients at least 6 months after the end of therapy (mean, 34.4 months; range, 6 to 72 months). Thirty-five patients had a second liver biopsy 1 year after interferon was stopped. We never saw a late relapse of alanine aminotransferase in the long-term responders during follow-up, regardless of the initial histologic findings. The relative frequency of viral persistence, as shown by HCV RNA in serum, was significantly higher in patients with cirrhosis (4 of 7 patients [57%]) than in those with chronic hepatitis (4 of 55 patients [7%]) (P = 0.001). Examination of the second liver biopsy specimens showed a profound decrease in necroinflammatory activity (range of hepatitis activity index scores, 10.8 ± 4.6 to 4.3 ± 2.6); no significant differences were seen for patients who were still HCV RNA positive after interferon therapy. No major disease events occurred during the entire follow-up period.
We conclude that for patients treated with interferon-a, the likelihood of becoming a long-term responder is 1 in 5 for patients with chronic hepatitis and 1 in 25 for patients with cirrhosis. Hepatitis C virus is not eradicated in all long-term responders, and the chances of losing HCV RNA are especially low for patients with cirrhosis. The sustained biochemical response appears to be long-lasting even when the virus continues to replicate.
In response:
We thank Craxl and colleagues for providing interesting information. We have been following 10 patients with chronic hepatitis C who received interferon-a and became longterm responders with detectable HCV RNA for 1.5 to 3 years. No patient had subsequent relapse, even with their detectable HCV RNA. We therefore agree with Craxi and colleagues that late alanine aminotransferase relapse is uncommon.
As we described in our article, liver histologic findings significantly improved in all long-term responders at the end of therapy, regardless of the presence of HCV RNA. However, we saw further improvement only in the long-term responders who showed loss of HCV RNA in 1-to 3-year follow-up examination of liver histologic findings. The ultimate goal of interferon treatment of chronic hepatitis C must be to clear the virus. However, when the chance of this is low, the next goal would be to prevent progression of the disease and the development of hepatocellular carcinoma. Can the long-term responders who did not lose HCV RNA reach this goal?
One of our 10 long-term responders with detectable HCV RNA was a 60-year-old Japanese man whose chronic hepatitis C was treated with interferon for 6 months. He became a long-term responder with detectable HCV RNA for 21 months after therapy ended. Liver histologic findings before treatment showed moderate chronic hepatitis, but those after treatment showed no significant improvement. Dynamic computed tomographic and ultrasound examinations of the liver were done before therapy was initiated and 9 months after therapy was discontinued. Neither showed a space-occupying lesion in the liver. Twenty-one months after the cessation of therapy, a 25-mm space-occupying lesion was detected in the liver by these examinations; abdominal angiography confirmed hepatocellular carcinoma.
Although patients with histologically chronic hepatitis rarely develop hepatocellular carcinoma, this patient had no history of consuming drugs or alcohol. This hepatocellular carcinoma may have already existed in the liver before therapy, or the persistent presence of HCV RNA may have caused the carcinoma. Because the follow-up period in most of our patients has not been long enough to provide definite answers to these questions, long-term responders, especially those with detectable HCV RNA, should have careful follow-up.
Michiko Shindo, MD, PhD Tadao Okuno, MD, PhD
Akashi Municipal Hospital Akashi, Hyogo 673, Japan
Folic Acid and Methotrexate in Rheumatoid Arthritis
To the Editor: Morgan and colleagues (1) clearly showed that supplementation with folic acid improved methotrexate tolerance in patients with rheumatoid arthritis. However, I find the conclusion that the folate supplement did not alter the efficacy of methotrexate somewhat difficult to accept on the basis of the data presented.
The data summarized in Table 2 of their report show that after 6 months of treatment, joint swelling and tenderness was either unchanged or worse in 39 and 35 patients, respectively, in the placebo group; 33 and 63 patients, respectively, in the low-dose folic acid group; and 13 and 43 patients, respectively, in the high-dose folic acid group. After 12 months of treatment, swelling or tenderness was unchanged or worse in 16 and 31 patients, respectively, in the placebo group; 9 and 43 patients, respectively, in the low-dose folic acid group; and 17 and 23 patients, respectively, in the high-dose folic acid group. I fail to see how one can evaluate efficacy from such data, given the large type II error entailed by the statistical analysis.
Toxicity seems to have been observed in only some patients who were not receiving folate. Was this toxicity predicted by folate status based on erythrocyte folate levels, dietary folate levels, multilobed neutrophil counts, and so forth? Several studies have shown that toxicity from folic acid antagonists is accentuated in patients who are folate deficient, and that even a folic acid antagonist that is usually inactive in humans (trimethoprim) may cause megaloblastic anemia in folate-deficient patients. It would be of interest if the toxicity observed in the control group was more common in patients whose folate status was worse, given that one might reserve folate supplements for these patients and thus not be required to determine whether efficacy is affected by such supplementation. To the Editor: Morgan and colleagues (1) noted an association between elevations in the mean corpuscular volume and the development of toxicity to the folic acid antagonist methotrexate in patients with rheumatoid arthritis. Although such a correlation has been independently reported (2) , there are potential pitfalls in relying on elevations in the mean corpuscular volume to indicate incipient methotrexate toxicity. Even in conditions typically characterized by macrocytosis, the mean corpuscular volume may be within the normal range in the presence of intercurrent conditions, such as iron deficiency, which predispose patients to microcytosis. Although determination of vitamin levels would be informative, a more cost-effective approach may be available.
Price-Jones (3) previously noted not only that the erythrocyte diameter increased in patients with pernicious anemia but also that the coefficient of variation in the erythrocyte size was twice that of normal erythrocytes. Currently, information on variation in erythrocyte volume is routinely provided in the automated complete blood count as the red cell distribution width (RDW). Combined analysis of the RDW (a measure of anisocytosis) and the mean corpuscular volume provide a useful approach to the differential diagnosis of anemia (4) . Moreover, elevations in the RDW often precede changes in the mean corpuscular volume or hemoglobin level (5) . An elevated RDW may be the only abnormality evident during the early stages of a nutritional deficiency and may be the most reliable indicator of mixed anemia. Thus, an elevated RDW might be a useful, early marker of the potential for impending methotrexate toxicity. Because the RDW is part of the routine complete blood count, such an approach would be cost-effective. We therefore suggest that the RDW be serially monitored in patients with rheumatoid arthritis who are receiving methotrexate. Elevations in the RDW may necessitate a change in the methotrexate or folate doses used, along with heightened vigilance for methotrexate toxicity. To the Editor: Morgan and colleagues (1) evaluated folate supplementation during methotrexate therapy for rheumatoid arthritis. It is encouraging to see evidence that such supplementation can reduce the severity of common side effects related to methotrexate therapy. Some questions remain, however, regarding the study design, the conclusions, and the recommendations.
First, patients in the high-dose arm of the study reportedly received 27.5 mg of folic acid per week (or approximately 5 mg/d as reported); however, previous interim reports of what I believe to be the same study stated that patients assigned to this arm received 50 mg weekly (10 mg/d for 5 days) (2, 3). Why was the dose changed? Were problems associated with the original dose, and, if the dose was changed after initiation of the study, how did that affect the blinding?
Second, the mean methotrexate dose reported in Morgan and colleagues' study (between 8.5 and 9.5 mg/wk) is slightly lower than that reported in previous controlled efficacy studies (10.5 mg/wk) and much lower than that of the long-term cohort studies (12.5 to 14 mg/wk). This discrepancy raises the question of the effectiveness of this supplementation throughout the range of methotrexate doses (5 to 30 mg/wk) currently used by rheumatologists. Almost one third of the patients in each study arm showed no clinical improvement while receiving these methotrexate doses, and almost two thirds of the patients reported some side effects related to methotrexate. The patients receiving highdose folic acid fared no better (in fact, they fared worse) in terms of the frequency of side effects than those receiving the lower dose (high-dose, 65%; low-dose, 48%). Thus, the data suggest that one should not adjust the folic acid dose through the range of folic acid used in the study to respond to side effects.
These points highlight some of the major differences between the study by Morgan and colleagues and our study (4) , which showed the effectiveness of low-dose leucovorin. My colleagues and I studied the overall frequency and severity of side effects and adjustments of medication in response to side effects persisting for more than 3 weeks. We also evaluated the full range of weekly methotrexate doses (as high as 30 mg/wk) and used a mean weekly methotrexate dose of 12 to 13 mg, which is more consistent with doses used in long-term cohort studies.
Before we embrace folic acid therapy over leucovorin therapy because of its reduced cost (between $6.00 and $20.00 a month), the comparative efficacy of folic acid over leucovorin must be proven. From the standpoint of convenience, taking a half tablet or one tablet of leucovorin 24 hours after methotrexate administration seems acceptable compared with taking one or more folic acid tablets daily for 5 days beginning 48 hours after methotrexate administration.
Jeffrey B. Shiroky, MD Cleveland Clinic Florida Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309
In response: Dr. Cooper questions the statistical validity of our conclusions regarding the effect of folic acid supplementation on the efficacy of methotrexate. Our sample size and power calculations were based on the toxicity data, which were the primary outcome of the study. We could not show any difference in the efficacy of methotrexate among the three treatment groups. Although Dr. Cooper is correct that we might not have had adequate power to show the existence of such differences, no trend suggested a dose response in patients receiving the higher dose of folic acid and experiencing less efficacy from methotrexate compared with those receiving the lower dose or those receiving no supplementation. The data presented by Dr. Cooper show random variation in efficacy measures, a factor in full agreement with the clinical experience that some patients respond to methotrexate and others do not. Given these random figures for the three treatment groups, increasing the sample size would probably not have altered the efficacy data in a clinically (not only a statistically) meaningful way.
That only some patients develop methotrexate toxicity has been documented in other studies. We have previously shown that folate status declines during low-dose methotrexate administration (1) and that in patients receiving placebo, future toxicity correlates with initial folate status (2) . Therefore, it may not be sufficient to reserve folate supplementation for patients with initially low levels, given that folate status deteriorates during methotrexate administration. Because folic acid is inexpensive, prescribing at least 400 to 1000 u,g of folic acid daily (and more if suspected methotrexate toxicity occurs) is prudent.
In response to the Drs. Kavanaugh, it is a good idea to evaluate RDW as well as the mean corpuscular volume as early markers of increased risk for methotrexate toxicity. Our report clearly warns that, because of the possibility of a dimorphic anemia, the mean corpuscular volume cannot replace blood folate levels as an indicator of risk.
Regarding Dr. Shiroky's questions, it is true that the initial reports (abstracts) of the trial indicated that the high-dose folic acid level was 50 mg/wk. The folic acid content of the capsules was analyzed and found to contain 1.0 ± 0.15 and 5.5 ± 0.3 mg of folic acid per capsule, even though the manufacturer was requested to supply 1.0 and 10 mg of folic acid. We did not analyze the supplements until the end of the trial because we were blinded to the randomization protocol. Therefore, we believe that we honestly reported the doses used in the final publication, and we did not rely on the manufacturer's values. No problems were associated with the original dose, and the dosage was not changed.
We reported that in many patients, joint swelling and tenderness did not markedly or moderately improve. We defined moderate improvement as a decrease in these variables of 30% to 49% (the American College of Rheumatology core set of criteria for rheumatoid arthritis trials requires only 20% improvement) (3). Failure to achieve moderate improvement, as defined, is not the same as having no clinical improvement. If the rheumatologists "were hesitant" about increasing the methotrexate dose, they were equally hesitant with the patients from all three study arms. The mean methotrexate dose in our patients has been reported previously and is similar to the dose used in the trial (4). Our rheumatologists and research assistants were blinded to the study group to which the patients were randomly assigned and thus used clinical judgment to manage their patients. Toxicities in both the low-and high-dose folic acid supplement groups were mild, of minor clinical importance, and of short duration. The observation of a difference in frequency of toxicity in these two groups is not clinically important.
Average methotrexate doses of 9 mg/wk and 12 mg/wk are not significantly different. We made no attempt to interfere with the rheumatologist's selection of the appropriate methotrexate dose. The designs of Shiroky and colleagues' study (5) and our study do not differ greatly. In our previous study (2) , uninterrupted, daily folic acid (1 mg) did not alter the efficacy of methotrexate. Thus, the timing of the folic acid dose appears to be unimportant to the efficacy of the methotrexate. We pointed out the need for more specific investigations regarding the timing of the folate relative to the antifolate dose.
Finally, we agree with Dr. Shiroky that a trial comparing folic acid and leucovorin would be useful, and we would be pleased to collaborate in such a trial. We have tried unsuccessfully to tap various sources to fund such a study. Such a trial, if correctly conducted, should definitively determine which is the best supplement to use in patients with rheumatoid arthritis treated with methotrexate. 
Increase in Serum Free Thyroxine Levels Related to Intravenous Heparin Treatment
To the Editors: Heparin has been shown to affect thyroid function test results (1, 2). Because heparin is now commonly used to treat patients with unstable angina or atrial arrhythmias, physicians should be aware of this interaction. We describe a patient with a heparin-induced increase in the serum free thyroxine level as measured by direct equilibrium dialysis and a one-step free thyroxine immunoassay.
A 62-year-old woman with diabetes mellitus, hypertriglyceridemia, and coronary artery disease presented with unstable angina. On physical examination she appeared to be euthyroid, with no palpable thyroid nodules or goiter. She began receiving intravenous heparin, and the serum free thyroxine level measured during heparin treatment using an in-house assay (Ciba Corning, Medfield, Massachusetts) was 21.9 pmol/L. Repeat measurement of free thyroxine in the same serum sample showed a level of 32.2 pmol/L; the serum thyroid-stimulating hormone level was normal at 4.2 mU/L (normal range, 0.35 to 5.5 mU/L). To determine the cause of increased free thyroxine levels, total thyroxine, free thyroxine as measured by equilibrium dialysis, and free (nonesterified) fatty acid levels were determined in available blood samples that were collected into heparin-free tubes at hospital admission before heparin treatment, during heparin treatment, and 3 days after heparin infusion. As shown in Table  1 , total thyroxine levels were not affected; the serum free thyroxine level increased only while the patient was receiving heparin and returned to baseline after therapy was discontinued. Heparin has been reported to cause an increase in free thyroxine levels in plasma when measured by direct equilibrium dialysis (1, 2) . This increase has been shown to be an in vitro artifact related to a heparin-induced increase in lipoprotein lipase activity, which thereby causes the hydrolysis of triglycerides and a subsequent increase in free fatty acid levels. The long incubation time required for the dialysis method may allow the generation of sufficiently high free fatty acid levels within the assay system to compete with or displace thyroxine from thyroxine-protein binding sites, leading to the false increase in measured free thyroxine levels (2, 3). The effect of intravenous heparin on free thyroxine levels, as determined by nondialysis methods has been more variable (4, 5) but does not appear to cause major changes in the results of assays that do not involve long incubation periods (5). Our patient had an increased free thyroxine serum level, even with an automated one-step immunoassay that can be completed within 15 minutes. Patients with hypertriglyceridemia may have a higher free fatty acid level while receiving heparin. This may lead to significantly elevated free thyroxine levels even with the shorter, more commonly used free thyroxine assays. A greater increase in free thyroxine levels may also be expected with samples that are not immediately assayed, a situation analogous to a prolonged incubation time. Physicians should recognize some of the limitations inherent in these assays so that misinterpreted thyroid function test results and inappropriate treatment are avoided.
Rita Jain, MD Harry L. Uy, MD University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio San Antonio, TX 78284
CPR-Not-Indicated and Futility
To the Editor: I was disappointed by the recent article by Waisel and Truog (1) . Although the authors noted that "unlike all other therapies, one had to get consent to withhold [cardiopulmonary resuscitation] CPR," they did not pursue this idea. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was devised for sudden unexpected deaths. It is not obvious that the routine application of CPR represents either good medicine or good ethics. Like most physicians, I have seen patients with terminal illnesses routinely resuscitated at great emotional cost, eventually proving nothing more than the house officer's truism, "If you can't keep them alive when they are alive, you can't keep them alive when they are dead."
In trying to reach a value-free conclusion (as if value judgments should always be avoided), the authors have fallen into the greater trap of assuming that providing CPR as a "default setting" is a value-free judgment. It isn't. It assumes that without explicit evidence, anyone would obviously want to be resuscitated rather than be allowed to die. That itself is a huge value judgment and does not reflect the real world. Further, it leads to a logically absurd medical ethic in which physicians are allowed to withhold therapies that are seen as irrelevant and inappropriate. However, when death occurs as a logical consequence of this approach, an obligation exists to perform CPR unless CPR has been explicitly refused. Why? Some patients are not comfortable with making explicit decisions about CPR even though they are content to accept that they are being made "comfortable" or that "everything reasonable will be done."
I personally have no problem with discussing plans with families to reach a consensus. However, I cannot accept that unilateral do-not-resuscitate policies are flawed simply because they involve value judgments. Has medicine abrogated the right to make value judgments, and, if so, to whom? Insurance companies? Hospital administrators? The real issue to consider is whether a moral or scientific basis supports the conclusion that CPR should automatically be provided in all cases when neither consent nor refusal has been stated. In my opinion, that position is not justified. To the Editor: Waisel and Truog (1) offer some good advice regarding futility policies for do-not-resuscitate orders and correctly identify several problems in defining "futility." Nonetheless, we believe that their defense of physiologic futility is problematic.
The reasons usually given to support a physiologic conception of futility are that it is somehow bad for physicians to make value judgments and that physiologic futility is value free, unlike other construals of futility. This line of reasoning is incorrect. One cannot practice medicine without making value judgments. The adoption of a physiologic criterion for futility entails a value judgment that many physicians would find flawed and indeed offensive, that is, that physicians are properly concerned with whether resuscitation restores circulatory and respiratory functions but not with whether the patient improves as a result.
Waisel and Truog also set up a false comparison when they criticize the "last hundred cases" type of policy. They note correctly that, statistically, this amounts to accepting a 95% confidence level that therapy would be successful no more than 3 of 100 times. They therefore implicitly suggest that far too much uncertainty exists in the "last hundred cases" criterion but none exists in their physiologic criterion. This suggestion is incorrect because one can never be 100% certain that a treatment will not have a certain physiologic effect; if one were to calculate the statistics, the prediction of physiologic futility might have at least the same level of uncertainty as any other policy proposal.
We believe that although we have not yet arrived at a perfect policy formulation for understanding medical futility, a physiologic conception is too narrow. To the Editor: Waisel and Truog (1) suggest that the medical decisions of physicians can be neatly separated from the value judgments that patients should make. By their reasoning, almost every patient whose surrogate claims that the patient would want CPR against the advice of their physician should receive it because the decision is partly a value judgment.
Let us admit that the decision to stop CPR is also value laden. It is not always medically clear when to stop resuscitation attempts. The heart and lungs of the permanently unconscious or terminally ill patient may be just one more chest compression away from recovery. Would Waisel and Truog suggest that we ask each patient or surrogate exactly how long they would like resuscitation attempts to be continued? If physicians cannot make value judgments regarding when to start CPR, certainly we should not be making value judgments regarding when to stop it. 
D. Malcolm Shaner, MD
To the Editor:
In their recent article, Waisel and Truog (1) attack unilateral do-not-resuscitate policies that use definitions of futility encompassing more than physiologic functioning. They rest their claim on the belief that a physiologically based conception of futility does not lead to the imposition of value judgments on patients. This assertion, however, is flawed. Consider a patient desiring antibiotics for what her physician concludes is a viral illness (2) . In this instance, antibiotic therapy would be futile in a physiologic sense. However, the patient may view her interaction with the physician differently; treatment may give the patient a sense of satisfaction that she values highly and may help to fulfill important emotional and psychological goals. The existence of the placebo effect supports this conclusion and further shows that values are at issue in all aspects of the physician-patient encounter.
More distressing, however, is the fact that unilateral do-notresuscitate policies may undermine the physician-patient relationship. Physicians currently cannot resolve the do-not-resuscitate issue without discussing it with their patients. They must talk honestly and openly about prognosis and the possible use and value of resuscitation. Often, such conversations prove both cathartic and beneficial for all involved (3). They visibly show the physician's commitment to his or her patient. Knowing that one can write a do-not-resuscitate order over the objection of a patient may remove part of the impetus that leads to such conversations. In turn, clinicians may devote less time to these important topics. As a result, the bond linking the physician and patient may be weaker than it would have been otherwise.
Andrew F. Shorr, MD, MPH
and thought-provoking review of issues related to futility, I question their definition of physiologic futility, which states that "CPR is futile only if it is impossible to do cardiac massage and ventilation." It is possible to envision instances in which it is physically possible to do cardiac massage and ventilation but not possible to achieve the proximal physiologic objectives of CPR. Physiologic futility may be more closely related to the impossibility of achieving the goals of CPR, such as effective cardiac muscle contraction that produces circulation adequate to supply vital organs and pulmonary gas exchange to remove waste C0 2 while supplying sufficient oxygen to vital organs. Is not CPR futile in patients in whom these objectives cannot be expected to be met but in whom cardiac massage and ventilation are physically possible?
Another question relates to the statement that "economic factors should be considered only if ... a reasonable guarantee exists that the money saved with this policy benefits other medical causes." This statement probably represents a value judgment, common among physicians, that may not be shared by some or even most members of society. Little doubt exists that medical care and health are valued highly in our society; however, other things are also highly valued, including education, national defense, and safety from crime. Depending on current conditions, society's concept of a desirable proportional allocation of scarce resources among highly valued causes may shift. In some circumstances, might not medical resources conserved by any "rationing" of CPR actually be best used to "benefit other causes"? To the Editor: Waisel and Truog's article (1) misrepresents the Seattle Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center policy on do-notresuscitate orders in two important respects. First, the VA policy acknowledges that values enter into determinations of quantitative and qualitative futility. Rather than allowing the physician's values to determine judgments of medical futility, the policy promotes shared decision making. It requires that physicians discuss their judgments of medical futility with the patient or surrogate and obtain agreement before writing a do-not-resuscitate order. In the absence of agreement, the policy outlines a conflict resolution process. As an academic teaching facility, the VA Medical Center uses this policy to teach physician trainees about the role of values in medical decision making and about the importance of open communication with patients and families.
Second, the Seattle VA policy recognizes the uncertainty inherent in judging medical futility. In fact, uncertainty is inherent in most medical decisions because physicians inductively use clinical evidence, aggregated data, and probabilities to make medical decisions. Again, the VA policy teaches physician trainees to acknowledge uncertainty and to draw on the best available evidence to make medical futility and other ethical judgments in medicine.
Finally, the VA policy attempts to fairly and consistently address cases in which patients or families ask for treatment that probably will not succeed or will result in a life that seems devoid of human value. These are the "futility cases" that the Seattle VA Medical Center most commonly encounters. Although Waisel and Truog advocate the idea of "physiologic futility," such an approach focuses attention on the least contentious element of medical futility. In our experience, most futility cases do not center on determining the effects of treatments but rather on determining whether treatment effects represent patient benefits. To the Editor: Although there is much to criticize in the paper of Waisel and Truog (1), we confine ourselves to one fundamental point. The authors echo the assertion that physiologic futility is somehow free of "imposed value judgment" (2) . By contrast, we have pointed out (3) that making physiologic function the object of medical treatment is not value free but rather a value choice, which, in our opinion, is about as far from a patientcentered goal of medicine as it is possible to be. Waisel and Truog do not say exactly why they consider physiologic futility to be free of value judgments. However, their statement that "definitions of physiologic function (such as circulation and ventilation) ... are more technical in nature and do not involve substantial value judgments" suggests that they have succumbed to what Alvan Feinstein has called the "curse of Kelvin," namely, "the basic sentiment is: When you cannot express it in numbers your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory" (4) . In other words, it is easier to count heartbeats and respiration than to determine when the patient no longer has the capacity to appreciate these organ functions as a benefit. This ease of measurement therefore provides the rationale for calling heartbeats and respiration the goals of medical treatment. Lord Kelvin himself is reported to have said, "All science is measurement but not all measurement is science." Similarly, we submit that all medicine represents outcomes, but not all outcomes represent medicine.
To the Editor:
In their assessment of CPR-not-indicated proposals, Waisel and Truog (1) conclude that "policies based on anything other than physiologic futility are indefensible," adding that physiologic futility "is a symbolic statement" that "does little to advance current practice management." For the house officer, such conclusions have little value. As the person who must carry out the word of any directives, the house officer is often caught in the middle of decisions on resuscitation.
Physiologic futility as a guideline for CPR-not-indicated policies has several drawbacks. First, physiologic futility is difficult to assess before implementing resuscitative measures. Second, when the patient reaches a point at which further measures would not restore physiologic function, the patient is already dead. Third, physiologic futility already exists, permitting the physician to "call a code." Thus, for the house officer, physiologic futility is an impractical approach.
In any policy for CPR-not-indicated orders, the direct relation of the house officer to the resuscitation decision sets up the possibility for conflict between housestaff values and patient or family wishes. Some of these conflicts are resolved by a "slow code," a practical but unethical resolution of the conflict in which physicians fail to inform families of their intention not to resuscitate. Patients and families must be aware of our plans and must be encouraged to seek alternate physicians when intentions differ. Housestaff should be involved in all levels of discussion.
A role exists for unilateral do-not-resuscitate orders and cogent definitions of futility. Decreasing stays in the intensive care unit will yield some cost savings. Public mistrust exists amid the suspicion of clandestine decision making. Concern for value judgments should be tempered by the knowledge that physicians make such judgments regularly when offering and withholding treatments. In the final analysis, fidelity, nonmaleficence, and utility supersede the concerns of paternalism in the decision to apply unilateral CPR-not-indicated orders. In response: We appreciate the thoughtful comments of the readers. Several, however, seem to misunderstand our position. We completely agree that "physiologic futility" is not value free. We also completely agree that "futility policies" that are based on the concept of physiologic futility will be useful only in very few cases.
Jonathan
Our central point is that any concept of futility implies an objectivity and neutrality toward values that is misleading. Although the notion of "physiologic futility" perhaps comes closest to achieving these features, we recognize that it is also inherently flawed.
We certainly agree with the readers that many of the treatments currently provided to patients are inappropriate and should not be used. We disagree, however, on the ways in which these refusals to treat should be justified. As several of the readers observe, after we acknowledge that these decisions to refuse therapy always involve competing values, it becomes clear that these conflicts must be resolved in a way that addresses these diverse values. This approach requires societal involvement and a dialogue between the medical profession and the community. As a result of this process, the questions are placed within a different framework. Instead of asking whether a treatment "works" (the futility question), we more appropriately ask whether providing a treatment is fair and reasonable under the particular circumstances. The concept of futility does more to muddle and confuse these issues than it does to resolve them. 
Physician Compliance with Guidelines
To the Editor: Ellrodt and colleagues' paper (1) highlights the difficulty physicians have with guidelines. However, "noncompliance" may not be an appropriate term to define physician response. Such findings as the high rate (42%) of misclassification and the lack of agreement among independent reviewers over medical appropriateness in records reviewed suggest differences in guideline interpretation.
Although Ellrodt and colleagues reported a similar distribution of physician mix between those who did and did not discharge appropriately, they did not indicate how these physicians compare with those in their respective specialties (for example, the percentages of compliant and noncompliant cardiologists). Were internists more or less compliant than cardiologists? Did the 13 noncompliant physicians differ from those who appropriately dis-charged the 151 patients? What types of physicians misclassified high-risk patients as having low risk, and the reverse?
Because comorbid conditions are a factor in delaying discharge, would multiple physician management of multiple illnesses contribute to preexisting inefficiencies of the health care system? Could this explain why more cardiologists were noncomplaint? Research suggests that cardiologists view internists and family practitioners as lacking the knowledge and practice to treat acute myocardial infarction (2) . Is this also true for noncardiac conditions? Kassirer (3) has noted that there is little difference between generalists and specialists in terms of quality of care.
If perceptions of what constitutes appropriate care are specialty based, how effective is physician-to-physician feedback in changing physician behavior? Do physicians usually consult with those in their own specialty when determining a course of treatment for the diseases they routinely manage? If so, treatment uniformity may be possible, but would such uniformity cross specialty lines?
Finally, is it feasible to expect diagnosis-specific guidelines from a consensus of different physician specialties? If different specialties develop different guidelines for the management of the same disease, can positive outcomes result from different and equally efficacious treatments? If so, whom are guidelines for? More importantly, how much weight should guidelines have for assessing quality of care? Betty C. Jung, RN, MPH Guilford, CT 06437
